How Restraint of Trade Agreements Are Enforced in Rwanda

A restraint of trade clause, whether it is called a non-compete, non-solicitation or non-dealing covenant, tries to stop a former employee, seller or business partner from using what they learned to compete against you. Businesses value these clauses because customer relationships, pricing knowledge and trade secrets are hard to protect in any other way. In Rwanda, however, no single statute is devoted to restraint of trade, so enforcement depends on how general contract principles apply to the clause in front of the court. Understanding those principles is the first step towards a covenant that stands a fair chance of being enforced. We are on the same page.
Where the law stands
Neither Law n° 66/2018 of 30/08/2018 regulating labour in Rwanda nor any other statute contains a dedicated non-compete regime. As practitioner guides note, the labour law is silent on non-compete provisions, which means that the parties may agree on them and that general civil and contract principles apply. The main reference point is Law n° 45/2011 of 25/11/2011 governing contracts. Under that law, a contract is valid if it has consent from parties with legal capacity, a lawful cause and an object that is possible and clearly defined. Parties enjoy freedom of contract, but that freedom is limited by public order and mandatory rules. They must also act in good faith, and clauses that unjustly favour one party may be invalidated.
What this means for restraint clauses
Because Rwandan law has not fixed a statutory test, a covenant is likely to be measured against these general ideas. The first is lawful cause. The clause must protect a legitimate business interest, such as confidential information, trade secrets, client relationships or the goodwill of a business that was sold, and a clause whose only purpose is to stop someone earning a living is vulnerable. The second is public order and fairness, since a restriction so broad that it prevents a person from working in their profession is likely to conflict with public order and the right to work. The third idea is balance between the parties. A one-sided clause that offers nothing in return, or that grossly favours the stronger party, risks being invalidated or reduced. The fourth is clarity, because an object that is not clearly defined can make an obligation unenforceable, and vague phrases such as “any competing activity” invite dispute. The practical conclusion is that reasonableness in scope, duration and geography is the best predictor of success. Reported Rwandan case law on non-competes is limited, so this remains something of a gray area in which careful drafting matters more than precedent. We are on the same page.
Employees versus business sellers
Reasonableness also depends on who gives the covenant. A covenant given by an employee is examined more closely, because the employee is the weaker party and depends on work for a livelihood. A covenant given by the seller of a business is generally easier to justify, since the buyer is paying for goodwill and is entitled to protection against the seller setting up next door the day after closing. Restrictions between commercial partners, distributors and franchisees fall somewhere in between and will depend on the bargaining position of each side. In addition, restraints that go beyond protecting the parties and affect competition in the market may be tested against competition rules.
Remedies if a covenant is breached
When a valid covenant is broken, the law of contract offers several remedies for non-performance, namely specific performance, termination or damages. In a restraint case, the usual aims are to stop the breach and recover losses. Damages aim to restore the injured party to the position it would have been in had the contract been performed. Fault is presumed for obligations of result unless the breaching party can show a lawful justification, and punitive damages may be awarded for deliberate misconduct or fraud. In practice, proving loss from lost clients can be difficult. For that reason, many agreements include a pre-agreed compensation clause. Such a clause should be set at a realistic level, because a figure that is out of proportion to the likely loss may be reduced by a court. Just do it by the book.
Drafting a clause that can be enforced
These principles translate into a handful of drafting habits. A good clause begins by identifying the interest it protects and states in the contract why the restriction is needed, for example because the person has access to client lists or pricing models. It then keeps the restriction narrow, limiting the restricted activities to those the person actually performed and the territory to where the business actually operates. It is also short. Commercial practice for non-solicitation covenants in Rwanda is typically around 12 months, and longer periods are harder to defend except in the sale of a business. A well-drafted clause gives something in return as well. For employees, this may be additional pay, a bonus or a paid leave arrangement during the restricted period. It lists confidentiality, non-solicitation and non-compete as separate obligations, so that if one is struck down the others survive. Finally, it uses plain language that both parties understand, is signed with a copy for each side, and sets out the forum for disputes and the availability of interim relief. In Rwanda, a restraint of trade agreement is neither automatically valid nor automatically void. It is enforceable to the extent that it protects a legitimate interest, is clear and proportionate, and respects good faith and public order. Businesses that draft narrowly, give fair consideration and plan how they will enforce the clause are best placed to turn a contractual promise into protection that holds. Time to get the ball rolling.